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Market Power and Trading Strategies on the
Electricity Market: A Market Design View
Walter Reinisch and Tetsuo Tezuka
Abstract—In this paper, we examine auction-based electricity
markets from the viewpoint of a power company in order to
evaluate the market design. Optimal trading strategies under un-
certainty are developed by abolishing the widespread assumption
that a single company has no influence on the market price. The
resulting trading strategies explain the high prices and the high
volatility observed in real electricity auction markets and show to
what extent power companies can manipulate the market price.
From these trading strategies, we derive critical points in market
design and formulate necessary and sufficient conditions that
characterize a competitive electricity auction market. Unfortu-
nately, these conditions are far from being realizable in practice,
from which follows that electricity auction markets cannot be
competitive.
Index Terms—Competition, double-sided auctions, electricity
market, market design, market power, oligopoly, trading strate-
gies, uniform-price auctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
WITH the deregulation of electricity markets in the lastyears, the electric power industry now faces a situation
of competition. Although the introduction of competition was
believed to result in lower electricity prices and more efficient
production, many countries now experience electricity market
prices higher than expected by economic considerations.
The reason for these market inefficiencies is, in common
sense of literature, market power and insufficient competition:
big companies can influence the market price by means of their
strategy. On top of that, even small suppliers seem to be able
to exercise market power in times of steep supply function
[1], and suppliers do not have any incentive to bid at marginal
cost [2]. To resolve these problems, some changes have been
applied to the electricity markets, and different approaches
have been discussed in research work. There are basically four
solution paths. In order to increase competition, one solution is
to increase the number of market participants by dividing big
companies into smaller ones, split capacity from big companies,
or wait for new entry [3].
Second, a change in the auction structure may result in
less chance to exercise market power [4]. Ren and Galiana
[5], [6] compare the two auction structures pay-as-bid and
uniform-price and conclude that pay-as-bid has some statistical
advantages over uniform-price auctions. They raise the question
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whether there will be a difference in the possibility of gaming
to the participants.
A third way is to introduce demand-side management to de-
crease market price by changing the demand curve. Kian et al.
[4] simulated the electricity market assuming a Nash–Cournot
game and that the companies’ profit function coefficients are
normally distributed and publicly available. The conclusion is
that double-sided auctions are preferable because of price re-
sponsive demand.
Finally, as a last resort, the introduction of price caps may try
to forcibly keep the prices low. However, this approach failed in
the California electricity market [1], [7] and may lead to relia-
bility problems [8].
In order to explain the high market prices, we may consult
game theory, which knows four different situations between
competitors [9]: cooperative and noncooperative games, both of
which being with conflict or without conflict. Since cooperation
is illegal, there are two cases left to consider.
In a noncooperative game with conflict, which is the basic
assumption in all the literature on market power, a company is
considered being in conflict with competing companies when
deciding the bidding price because the competitor’s strategy is
unknown. Due to this assumption of a certain amount of com-
petition, the only possibility to achieve higher market prices lies
in utilizing an advantage in competition due to excess informa-
tion or higher generation capacity. This leads to the discussion
of market power [4] and to new trading strategies that utilize
market information to achieve higher revenues [10], [11].
In a noncooperative game without conflict, companies may
influence the market price without communication. They may
bid at a price higher than marginal cost without considering the
competitors’ strategies. If a market turns out to fall in this cat-
egory of games, it is not competitive, and changes in market
structure are necessary. Since we cannot exclude the possibility
of a game without conflict, we investigate what conditions have
to be fulfilled to achieve a state where the optimal bidding price
is equal to marginal cost. In this optimal state of the market, a
company does not have influence on the market price any more.
Therefore, the resulting conditions also define a market of per-
fect competition.
We estimate the optimal bidding price on an electricity
auction market from the viewpoint of a company of arbitrary
size by maximizing the expected profit of the trading decision
for one auction, considering that the company has influence
on the market price only by withholding generation capacity.
We assume that the market price arises from the intersection
of supply and demand function and that the market price may
be considered as a random variable with arbitrary probability
0885-8950/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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density function. No further assumptions are needed for our
investigation.
The resulting trading strategies are then analyzed from the
viewpoint of market design in order to find conditions that an-
nihilate the company’s influence on the market price.
II. OPTIMAL TRADING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The following trading strategies optimize a company’s total
profit, say, , dependent on the market price, which we denote
with . Because the market price is uncertain, it is considered
as a random variable, say, . is defined by its probability
density function , and is therefore a sample of . We
further denote the cumulative distribution function of with
and .
The company under consideration has a total generation ca-
pacity of and makes bids on the auction market, which we
identify by the index . We denote the bids with
, the achieved price for a bid with , and the volume of the
bids with , for which holds . The marginal cost
for production of the quantity is denoted with . The number
of bids is chosen equal to the number of power plants, i.e., one
bid for every power plant, so is equal to the capacity of power
plant , and is equal to its marginal cost. The index is chosen
such that the bids’ cost are ordered
(1)
and therefore the corresponding bids are ordered as well
(2)
The total profit over all power plants is the sum over the plants’
profits
(3)
and the power plant’s profit is revenue less cost
(4)
The relation between the market price and the power plant’s
achieved price depends on the auction format, so we will
define this relation in the sections of the respective auctions.
The expected profit is
(5)
which is dependent on the bids . The optimal trading strategy
is therefore the set of bids that maximizes (5).
A. Optimal Trading Strategy for the
Generation-Only Company
The company we consider in this section does not have access
to the retail market. All capacity is offered on the electricity spot
market.
To derive the optimal trading strategy, we calculate the max-
imum expected profit for the two cases of pay-as-bid and uni-
form-price auctions.
1) Pay-as-Bid Auctions: In pay-as-bid auctions, the achieved
price of a power plant is equal to the bidding price if the
corresponding bid wins the auction, i.e., if the bid is smaller
than or equal to the market price . The market price is the
price of the most expensive power plant that wins the auction.
The revenue of a single power plant is therefore, with (4)
for
for (6)
For this calculation of the expected profit, we assume a per-
fect competitive market, so that the company does not have in-
fluence on the market price. Considering the uncertainty of the
market price, the expected profit is ,
which gives, with (6)
(7)
and, since is independent of
(8)
The first-order condition to maximize for
yields
(9)
which may be solved numerically for given cost under the
assumption of a specific distribution.
In order to evaluate the potential of bidding at higher prices
than marginal cost, we have to examine the probability distribu-
tion in more detail. There are two cases to consider: a distribu-
tion with a finite maximum price, say, , and an unbounded
distribution. In the latter case
(10)
holds for the solution of (9), independent of , since
and . In the former case,
if is less than the distribution’s upper bound.
Under normal equilibrium conditions, i.e., , and,
since we assumed that the company cannot influence the market
price, in a perfect competitive environment, the optimal bid is
higher than marginal cost. This characteristic of the pay-as-bid
auction would give unsatisfying high prices on the electricity
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market, and therefore, it would not be our preferred choice in
market design.
2) Uniform-Price Auction: In the case of a uniform-price
auction, the achieved prices of the power plants are equal to
the uniform market price .
We begin the calculation of the optimal strategy with the case
of a perfect competitive environment. This assumption will be
abandoned later on.
a) Company Is a Price Taker: In case the company does





is the index of the bid under consideration, . The
expected profit is
(12)
With the first-order condition for ,
the optimal bids are for all bids (see the Appendix for
the derivation). This corresponds to the widespread economic
understanding that led to the deregulation process in the elec-
tricity industry.
b) Company Does Influence the Market Price: The power
company may try to influence the market price by adapting the
bid of a single power plant. If the company succeeds, it loses
the bid for this power plant but has in return a higher revenue on
the remaining power plants. This strategy can be accomplished
without having too much risk, if the bids of the remaining power
plants are reasonably low.
Therefore, by withholding some generation capacity, a gener-
ation company will try to influence the market’s supply function
and increase the resulting market price. However, rather than
shutting down the power plant, the generation company may de-
cide to bid above the expected market price. This increases the
chance of selling additional electricity in case the market price
is even higher than expected. Fig. 1 illustrates this strategy: bid-
ding a cheap power plant (top graph in Fig. 1) at a higher price
(bottom graph in Fig. 1) does increase the market price.
This means that we have to drop the assumption that the com-
pany does not have influence on the market price, which was
the condition for the above calculation that led to an optimal
equal to . In order to formulate this situation, we split the
market price into two components: denotes the price without
influence of the company, and the resulting market price is de-
noted with . Note that, even though is a price without influ-
ence of the company, is not a competitive price, because the
company is withholding generation capacity.
As demonstrated before, the company may influence the
market price by withholding some capacity. If we denote this
capacity with , the influenced market price is, without
Fig. 1. Merit order cost curve of a small power system depending on the bid of
a single power plant at marginal cost (top) or at a price higher than the market
price (bottom).
loss of generality, a function of .
describes the electricity market in all its complexity, including
competitors and physical constraints. is an arbitrary vector
that represents the state of the market. This function has two
basic characteristics: if the company does not withhold some
capacity , then there is no change in market price
, and therefore, . Furthermore,
must rise as rises, so . In case
for all , then the market is per-
fectly competitive.
These characteristics of allow for a linear approxi-
mation in the point . With the slope of in
, , we get the approximation1
(13)
quantifies the possible influence of a single company on the
resulting market price. We will discuss in more detail later on
in this paper.
The new market price results from different optimal bids.
If we split the bids in the same manner into a bid without price
influence denoted by and the company’s price influence, this
price influence must be equal to , in order to achieve the
change in price . denotes the capacity that
1We assumed that f(q;a) is differentiable in q. For non-differentiable
f(q;a), we may replace the differentiation with the differential quotient
to achieve the same approximation, i.e., k = (f(q + h; a)   f(q  
h; a))=(2h), for an arbitrary h > 0. The differentiations in the description of
f(q;a) then change correspondingly.
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the company withholds if the corresponding bid is the highest
winning bid of the company. The new influenced bids, denoted
with , are therefore . The right graph of Fig. 2
shows the relationship between the bids, the prices, and the with-
held capacity. For simplicity, the graphs are built up of smooth
bidding functions , , and instead of discrete bids
and . The functions and are described
in detail in Section II-C1.
Considering the situation that , the power
plants with bids and higher are too expensive, lose the
auction, and may influence the market price. According to above
consideration, only those power plants contribute to , which
could have won the auction under uninfluenced conditions. In
other words, those power plants that fulfill the conditions
and are responsible for the change in the market price.
To formulate this relation, we define the step-function
for
for . (14)
The quantity effecting the market price then results in
(15)
for . In case the resulting market price is greater than
the bid of the most expensive power plant , then and






Since is not exactly known to the company, we assume
being a sample from a random variable with an arbitrary
probability density function . If we compare with , we
find that they have equal distribution, since the corresponding
bids differ in volume, not in price. So is a sample of . Con-
sidering the random variables and being independent, the
expected profit is
(18)
By rewriting the profit (11) for and inserting (17), we get
(19)
The bids that maximize (19) are
for
for (20)
which we derive in the Appendix. is the expectation value of
the random variable .
Note that the optimal bids are independent of the proba-
bility distribution of the market price . Therefore, it does not
matter what external factors may influence . It may even be
subject to strategic action of the competitors.
The optimal bids represent a step-wise bidding function
that is bound to the number of power plants and their respective
quantities . A continuous bidding function is established with
the limit . The bids then change to the bidding
function , and becomes the marginal cost function .
With approaches zero, approaches ,
and from (20) follows that
(21)
B. Optimal Trading Strategy for Integrated Companies
Integrated companies do not only sell their electricity to the
spot market but also to their customers having a fixed contract to
a specific price. They have basically two targets when bidding
on the spot market: if the spot market price is high enough, they
sell electricity and act the same way as a generation-only com-
pany would. If the spot market price is smaller than the cost of
their own production facilities, they can increase their profit by
buying on the spot market instead of producing by themselves.
In this case, these companies try to influence the market price
by bidding below their cost.
In order to give a formulation for the expected profit, we con-
sider that the cheapest power plants are needed to satisfy the
customers with fixed contracts. We denote the price of the fixed
contracts with and calculate the profit depending on the in-
fluenced market price , shown in (22) at the bottom of the next











From this, we can see that, if demand and supply side are
equally powerful, the resulting market price does not change
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very much compared to the case of perfect competition. The
resulting market supply function increases by the same amount
as the demand function decreases. The equilibrium volume is
less than in the competitive case, though.
C. Influence Factor
In the previous sections, we found that the influence factor
plays an important role in the decision of the power company.
Since would be useless if we could not determine its value, we
derive in the following a relationship between and the market
supply and demand functions.
1) Calculation: Let be the demand function the com-
pany faces on the electricity market, which is dependent on the
quantity and the market state . We denote the slope of this
demand function with . We further de-
note the market’s demand function with and the supply
function resulting from the competing companies with .
Their slopes taken at the point of market equilibrium are and
, respectively.
Since the market supply function results from the sum of the
supply functions of the generation companies, the demand func-
tion the company faces is equal to market demand less the sum
of the supply functions of all competing companies. The sum is
taken in volume, so we have to consider the inverse functions
of and , denoted by ,
and , for which holds
(25)
as illustrated in the left graph of Fig. 2.
The market equilibrium results from the intersection between
the bids of the company under consideration and its demand
. The price difference between influenced and competi-
tive case is therefore under linear approximation
, from which follows that is equal to . With (25),
we find and
(26)
Fig. 2. Comparison of competitive and noncompetitive bidding functions on
the electricity market. The area marked by the shaded rectangle in the left graph
is shown in more detail in the right graph.
2) Estimation: Econometric estimation of and there-
fore allows to derive a value for . In order to get an idea about
the value of , we make a very rough estimation on the basis
of historic market data from the California electricity market,
which is publicly available from the University of California
Energy Institute [12]. Since we cannot determine the supply
function of specific companies, we estimate from the market
supply function. The resulting value of therefore represents
the influence of a newly emerging company that does not have
its market share yet. We further assume that the demand is per-
fectly inelastic, so that .
A linear regression of market price on market volume,
as shown in Fig. 3, results in a value of
$ MWh GWh. Although this is a very rough esti-
mation that is probably valid for off-peak periods only, the
electricity market price shows a noticeable reaction of about
2.6$/MWh increase for every GWh withheld from the market.
3) Characteristics: In case there is no demand elasticity,
is equal to the first derivative of the supply func-
tion . In case of monopoly, there is no supply function of
competing companies and .
The slope of the supply function is in peak periods greater
than in off-peak periods. The possible influence on the market
price is higher as well, since increases with increasing slope of
the supply function. This results in more market power in peak
periods. Therefore, for bidding on multiple auctions, a company
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Fig. 3. Linear regression of market price on market volume for the market data
of the California electricity market from 1999.
TABLE I
TRADING STRATEGY FOR A GIVEN SET OF POWER PLANTS
is further influenced by transmission constraints. The
electricity exchange handles these constraints by dividing the
market into several areas[13]. In times where electricity trans-
mission is insufficient, the market splits into areas with separate
market prices and separate values of . If the transmission
capacity is sufficient, the connected areas share the market
price and their .
is independent of the marginal cost function of the bidding
company. Physical generation constraints like production limits,
ramp rates, or minimum up and down times do not influence the
value of . The trading strategy is therefore somewhat indepen-
dent from the generation process of the own company.
D. Examples
In order to present a more clear picture of the proposed
trading strategy, let us consider a few examples for illustration.
1) Bids for Optimal Influence on the Market Price: We
consider a power company with four power plants. The power
plants’ properties are marginal cost and quantity for one auc-
tion, as shown in Table I, columns “Quantity” and “Cost.” The
calculation of the optimal bids is dependent on the influence
factor , which we take from the estimation above. Column
“Calculation” shows the details of the calculation, and the
resulting optimal bid is given in column “Bid” of Table I. For
power plant 4, we find that due to market power, the bid is
about 27% above marginal cost.
2) Optimal Bid of a Monopolist: For the case of mo-
nopoly, the resulting market price can be calculated using
the well-known approach of marginal revenue. This allows to
Fig. 4. Calculation of monopoly price by marginal revenue (left graph) and by
k-factor (right graph).
compare the approach presented in this paper with traditional
methods.
For simplicity, let us consider that marginal cost and demand
are linear functions in quantity
demand
cost (27)
is the marginal cost function, with the slope and
the offset . is the demand function’s offset. We fur-
ther consider some values of the functions’ parameters,
$ MWh GWh $ MWh
$ MWh GWh, and $ MWh.
In the case of the traditional approach, the marginal revenue
is then a linear function in volume
(28)
with slope and offset . The marginal revenue
is the change of total revenue with changing quantity




$ MWh GWh. The market-clearing volume results
from the intersection of marginal revenue and marginal cost,
i.e., . is the market-clearing volume, which
results in GWh. The corresponding market clearing
price is $ MWh. The left graph of Fig. 4 illustrates
this calculation.
With the method presented in this paper, the market-clearing
price can be calculated by construction of the optimal bids of
the monopolistic generator. Since the cost are linear, the bidding
function is linear as well
(30)
with slope and offset . With (21) and , we get
and . The market equilibrium volume
results from the intersection between the bidding curve and the
demand function , which yields for the equilib-
rium volume . As we can see, the results are the same in
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both approaches. To illustrate the difference between these ap-
proaches, we compare the calculations in Fig. 4. The left graph
shows the conventional approach and the right graph the one
presented in this paper. In order to calculate marginal revenue
, the demand function must be known in detail, i.e., with
its offset. In the new approach, the knowledge of is sufficient
to calculate optimal bids . Bidding , the market equi-
librium will always end up in a perfect monopoly equilibrium,
independent of demand shifts, as long as the slope is con-
stant. This situation is indicated with thin lines for demand in
the right graph of Fig. 4.
3) Oligopoly With Two Players: We consider two companies,
and , both having linear marginal cost functions and
with equal parameters
(31)
The slope and the offset is common to both companies,
the quantities and , the companies get awarded by the
electricity market auction, depend on their strategies. We further
use the demand function from the last example .
In the market equilibrium, demand quantity is equal to supply
quantity , and the price is
(32)
The respective profits and are total revenue less total cost
(33)
a) Conventional oligopoly approach: We calculate the op-
timal bids according to an oligopolistic Cournot model and use
the quantities as decision variables. This approach is used by
the majority of research work on oligopolistic electricity mar-
kets, e.g., [14] analyzes electricity market price peaks in a sim-
ilar setting like in this example. References [4] and [15] inves-
tigate more complex electricity market configurations. A Nash
equilibrium is reached, if both companies cannot increase their
profits by adapting their offers. Therefore, the first-order condi-




b) -Factor for the Cournot model: The basic assumption in a
Cournot model is that every company considers the competitors
placing bids with a constant quantity. Therefore, the slope of the
competitors’ bidding functions is considered infinite and
. Under this assumption, the optimal bidding function is
(36)
denotes the quantity supplied by each company,
. The market equilibrium is found at
(37)
which is equivalent to (34) and gives therefore the same results
(35) as the conventional approach. The main difference is that
the companies bid, in contrary to their own assumptions, with
a finite slope , which is not an optimal
strategy, as we show in the following.
Let us consider both companies bidding with different strate-
gies. decides to use the Cournot approach and bids with
. knows ’s strategy and uses and
(38)
In the market equilibrium, the quantities the companies get
awarded are
(39)
Obviously, company has less volume than and therefore
less profit, since price and marginal cost function are common
to both of them.
So we must conclude from this example that all compa-
nies must bid with a predefined volume in order to fulfill the
assumption of constant quantity for their competitors. This
strategy circumvents the market mechanisms of the auction
market and its capability of creating a market equilibrium in
price and volume, since the volume is decided in advance. From
the viewpoint of the auction market, the companies divide the
market among them. Therefore, the Cournot model represents a
collusive market equilibrium and would give unreasonably high
equilibrium prices for a low demand elasticity, as discussed in
[16].
c) Optimal trading strategy: With (21) and (26), the optimal
bidding function is for both companies , and
the cost functions are the same as before. is the optimal slope
of the bidding function for maximum expected profit. It is de-
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Using a conventional approach, the equilibrium point for
strategies with arbitrary supply functions is found with the
supply function equilibrium [17]
(41)
is the total cost function, is the supply function,
and is the demand function. Equation (41) is defined for
, so represents a price relative to the offset of the
marginal cost function, , and
. Demand and supply are functions of the price,
, and . Their
first derivatives are and , and
therefore
(42)
which can be rewritten to (40).
The examples show that the approach presented in this paper
is equivalent to conventional methods like Cournot–Nash equi-
librium or supply function equilibrium, if their respective as-
sumptions are added.
III. MARKET DESIGN ANALYSIS
The previous sections show that it is very easy for the compa-
nies to increase their profits at low risk by bidding higher than
marginal cost. There is little reason why companies should bid
less than the price that maximizes their profits. Therefore, the
duty of market design is to prohibit strategic bidding by means
of an adequate set of market rules. In particular, since we know
the point of maximum profit of a company (21), we can compare
the result with ideal conditions and check possible market rules
for their effectiveness in making the market ideal competitive.
A. Changing Auction Format to Pay-as-Bid Auctions
If all market participants use the trading strategy of maximum
profit (9), the resulting market price is higher than the marginal
cost. Furthermore, when considering repeated auctions over
time starting at marginal cost, the resulting market price is
higher than marginal cost after the first trading step. This
increases the expected market price, which in turn increases
the optimal bids on the following trading day. This means that
market prices may rise, independent of number and size of
market participants, until an upper bound is reached, which
must be given by law.
The optimal trading strategy for pay-as-bid auctions is de-
rived under the assumption of perfect competition, i.e., a single
company does not have influence on the market price. There-
fore, the effect of rising market prices may even be worse if the
company’s influence is considered.
This auction format allows for bids above marginal cost, even
in the competitive case. Furthermore, the optimal bid rises with
the market price expectation, which makes the market-clearing
price unstable. Therefore, this auction format is with respect to
the possibility of gaming inferior to the uniform-price auction.
B. Increasing the Number of Market Participants
Besides changing the auction format, another prominent ac-
tion in increasing the competition on the electricity market is to
increase the number of market participants. This can be done
by dividing existing companies or by decreasing the barriers for
new companies entering the market. Though it is obvious that a
higher number of companies will increase competition, we can
estimate the effectiveness of such a change in the market.
With (21), the deviation of the bidding function from mar-
ginal cost is proportional to the volume . In a
scenario of equally sized companies being divided into
equally sized smaller companies, the companies’ influence on
the market price will be cut in half, since their volume de-
creases correspondingly. In a scenario of some small companies
entering a market of well-established big companies, the influ-
ence of those big companies will not change very much.
Although a higher number of market participant can decrease
market power, there will always remain a significant amount that
cannot be removed. So this approach is not sufficient for perfect
competition.
C. Demand-Side Management
The market power of the companies strongly depends on the
expected value of , which in turn depends on the slope of de-
mand and supply function (26). For a closer investigation in the
influence of demand-side management, we define relative to
. The influence factor then becomes
(43)
from which we can see that, if the demand side is quite inelastic
compared to the supply side, e.g., , then a very big
change on the demand side to will not have very much
influence on for changes to
with . Therefore, demand-side management will be a
drop in the ocean unless we manage to make the demand side
as elastic as the supply side, i.e., or , which
means that there are full generation companies with excess ca-
pacity on the demand side.
D. Price Caps
From the viewpoint of a generation company, the character-
istics of the market, i.e., the slope of demand and supply, do not
change with the introduction of price caps. Therefore, the op-
timal trading strategy will not change for bids below the price
cap.
If the optimal bid would exceed the price cap, the company
basically has two options: first, bid with a price equal to the price
cap. This strategy will result in some difficulties for the oper-
ator of the energy exchange, who must decide how to distribute
the equilibrium volume to suppliers with equal bids, in case the
market equilibrium reaches the price cap. The second option for
the supplying company is to truncate its bidding function at the
price cap. This will probably be the preferred strategy, since the
market will not clear if demand exceeds supply at the price cap,
and the system operator would be forced to remove the price cap
in order to ensure reliable electricity supply.
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Therefore, price caps may lead to reliability problems, as dis-
cussed in [8], or their introduction fails, as explained for the Cal-
ifornia electricity market by Wilson [7, Appendix], who says
“One lesson learned was that a price cap is meaningless unless
the System Operator curtails demand when supplies offered at
the price cap are insufficient.”
E. Summary
With (21), we find that big companies can influence the
market price more easily than small ones. This corresponds to
common market understanding and proves the presumption of
Borenstein [1] that small companies may also have influence.
It also matches the quantitative analysis of Bialek [18], who
found that the market power may be proportional to the “effec-
tive market share,” and the arguments of Bunn and Martoccia
[19], who state that it is clear that “a generator would generally
mark-up plant higher in the stack proportionally more than
those below it.”
Together with the theoretical viewpoint presented in this
paper, these findings can be summarized with the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: Considering a uniform-price electricity auc-
tion market and participants, each of them able to influence
the market price only by adapting their supply functions, their
optimal bids are equal to marginal cost if and only if one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
1) the expected slope of the cumulative supply function of any
participants is zero, ;
2) the expected slope of the demand function is equal to zero,
.
Proof: The optimal bidding function is, under linear
approximation in the point of perfect competition (21),
. Because the approximation is exact in the point of
perfect competition, it follows that is fulfilled for every
company if and only if is equal to zero. With (26) and (25),
this is true for any of the participants if the slope of the cu-
mulative supply function of the remaining companies or
the slope of the demand function are known to be zero, ,
or .
Although an electricity auction market suffers from market
power if none of these conditions is fulfilled, it seems little prac-
ticable for deriving recommendations for real markets, since the
slopes of demand and supply function will always differ from
zero. We must therefore follow that an electricity market can
never be perfectly competitive.
However, if we consider any real electricity auction market
and denote the number of generation companies with , then it
is almost certain that we find at least one company such that the
remaining companies are not able to satisfy the whole
market’s demand. The th company can bid at any high price
without reaching a point of zero demand, it enjoys a situation of
“unrestricted market power.”
Therefore, it must be required that any companies
have enough generation capacity to satisfy the whole market de-
mand in order to prevent from “unrestricted market power.” This
finding corresponds to the arguments of Haas [20], who states
that excess capacity is a necessary requirement for a functioning
electricity market. The above relation can be summarized with
another, less restrictive proposition.
Proposition 2: An electricity market with participants is
free of “unrestricted market power” if and only if any
participants are able to satisfy the whole market demand.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once we accept that the electricity market is noncompetitive
with all its consequences, namely, that the market participants
do have influence on the market price, we find a view on the elec-
tricity market that combines the perceptions and observations
of recent research into one picture that answers open questions
about market power on the electricity market.
The existence of market power follows directly from the
single assumption of noncompetitiveness. Oligopoly assump-
tions may be added to find the point of maximum market
influence, and econometric methods may be used to evaluate
the actual conditions of a specific market.
We show in this paper an optimal trading strategy for gener-
ation companies under uncertainty, which allows us, apart from
well-known approaches like Cournot–Nash games or assump-
tions of collusion, to explain the companies’ behavior, resulting
in market power and a high market price volatility. This trading
strategy is independent of traditional assumptions used for mod-
eling the market under consideration. However, adapting the pa-
rameter according to these assumptions makes the method
presented in this paper equivalent to conventional approaches,
which we explicitly show for the case of monopoly, Cournot
game, supply function equilibrium, and perfect competition.
On the basis of this trading strategy, we derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for establishing an ideal competitive elec-
tricity auction market. Unfortunately, these conditions are far
from being realizable, which makes us conclude that an elec-
tricity auction market can never be perfectly competitive in a
deregulated environment.
From this viewpoint, it was an illusion to believe that a higher
number of supplying companies is sufficient to eventually bring
a competitive market price. Unconditional deregulation seems
to end up in a situation of survival of the fittest, which, in con-
trast to common economic belief, does not lead to perfect com-
petition in the sense that the market price is equal to marginal
cost. It rather equips the fittest with the necessary instruments to
extend its dominant position. Perfect competition therefore does
not emerge on its own; it needs to be introduced by a carefully
designed market environment.
APPENDIX
OPTIMAL BID ON A UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION MARKET
A. In a Perfect Competitive Market
The first-order condition for (12) is
(44)
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for and
(45)
for . Both cases yield after collection of summands
(46)
Since , possible solutions are and
. gives information about the quality of these
solutions
(47)
For , we find that as well, since
. Furthermore, the derivatives left and right of
are of opposite sign, again because and
. Therefore, for , we get ,
representing a saddle point, which is not a valid maximum.2
For , and therefore,
is a valid maximum.
B. Without Assumption of Perfect Competition




2For non-differentiable G (b ), we may replace the derivatives with the cor-
responding differential quotients to show the quality of the solution G (b ) =
0.
Collection of the summands yields
(50)
After elimination of and with follows
(51)
which, using (16) and , yields (20).
In case , from follows
(52)




from which follows again (20).
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